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AN ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW. By Andrew Koppelman. 1
University of Chicago Press, 2002. Pp. 210. Cloth $48.00,
Paper $17.00.
Mark Strassel
Andrew Koppelman teaches both political science and law,
and it is thus unsurprising that his book The Gay Rights Question
in Contemporary American Law incorporates both political and
constitutional theory in his analysis. This review will focus on the
latter, although there is every reason to believe that his analysis
is just as thought-provoking in his use of political theory.
The issues and analyses discussed in this book are hotly debated. The utter lack of consensus that exists can be explained,
at least in part, by the Court's not having been sufficiently clear
in what it has held and why, whether in cases involving lesbian,
gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) rights in particular or
constitutional law more generally. It thus should be unsurprising
that even those who agree that same-sex marriage should be
recognized may nonetheless disagree about the best constitutional analysis of the cases discussed in this book.
Romer v. Evans/ one of the first cases discussed by Koppelman, is a good illustration of a case which has been given numerous interpretations, both by commentators and by the Justices themselves. In Romer, the Court struck down Amendment
2, an amendment to the Colorado Constitution passed by referendum, which precluded localities from offering antiI. Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
2. Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University. I would like to thank Professors
Brian Bix and James Beattie for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this review. I
am solely responsible for any remaining errors.
3. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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discrimination protection on the basis of orientation. Koppelman
writes,
Romer's rule [ ]may [ ] be summarized-if a law targets a
narrowly defined group and then imposes upon it disabilities
that are so broad and undifferentiated as to bear no discernible relationship to any legitimate governmental interest, then
the court will infer that the law's purpose is simply to harm
that group, and so will invalidate the law. (p. 8)

Certainly, this is one possible reading of Romer, although
the Court's subsequent actions have made this interpretation less
plausible. For example, as Koppelman notes, (seep. 162 n.142)
the electorate in Cincinnati, Ohio, passed a referendum that was
quite similar in content to Amendment 2. The constitutionality
of that referendum was upheld by the Sixth Circuit in Equality
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati. 4 The
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Sixth Circuit opinion
because the Court had decided Romer in the interirn. 5 The Sixth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the referendum on remand and, this time, the Court declined to grant certiorari. 6
It is difficult to know what, if anything, to make of the
Court's denial of certiorari after the Sixth Circuit's ruling on remand was appealed.7 However, were Koppleman's reading of
Romer correct, the Court presumably would have struck down
the Cincinnati referendum as well. The language contained in
the Cincinnati and Colorado referendum propositions was strikingly similar and it would be difficult if not impossible to distinguish the cases on the basis of the content of the propositions
submitted to the voters. While Romer clearly stands for the
proposition that a statute lacking any rational relationship to legitimate state interests will be struck down even on rational basis
review, 8 that was uncontroversial even before the Court decided
Romer. What is more controversial is Koppelman's claim about
when the Court will infer that a statute is motivated by animus
4. 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) vacated and remanded, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996), reaffirmed on remand, 128 F.3d 289 (1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943 (1998).
5. Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S.
1001 (1996).
6. See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 525
u.s. 943 (1998).
7. See, for example, id. at 944 (Stevens, 1., concurring) ("The Court's action today
should not be interpreted either as an independent construction of the charter or as an
expression of its views about the underlying issues that the parties have debated at
length.")
8. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
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and, regrettably, Equality Foundation suggests that the Court is
less willing to infer animus than Koppelman implies.
Koppelman suggests that were the Court to have recognized
that discrimination on the basis of orientation was sex discrimination, then Romer would have been easily explainable by appealing to the Hunter v. Erickson 9 line of cases. (p. 24) Yet, notwithstanding the Romer Court's declining to adopt that tack
expressly10 and notwithstanding the Court's reluctance to recognize orientation discrimination as a form of sex discrimination, a
Hunter analysis may nonetheless provide the best explanation of
Romer and the failure to grant certiorari when Equality Foundation was again appealed.
First, the Hunter voting rights analysis does not only protect
the rights of suspect or quasi-suspect classes and, for example,
has been held by a state intermediate appellate court to protect
the voting rights of individuals on the basis of sexual orientation
and HIV status. 11 Second, and more relevant to why the Romer
Court might have refused to grant certiorari in Equality Foundation, the Sixth Circuit distinguished Romer by appealing to considerations that might be thought important in a Hunter analysis,
e.g., that the Cincinnati referendum was at the lowest political
level. 12 While the Sixth Circuit's analysis in Equality Foundation
is itself subject to criticism, e.g., because Hunter itself involved
an invidious attempt to alter a minority's voting rights at the
lowest politicallevel,13 the Sixth Circuit was clearly implying that
Romer is best understood as a Hunter voting rights case and the
Court permitted that analysis to stand.
Koppelman suggests that Bowers v. Hardwick may be a
stumbling block to the recognition that orientation is a quasisuspect classification. (p. 30) Certainly, the anti-gay tone of
Bowers is hard to mistake/ 4 and Bowers is open to a variety of
9. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
10. The Colorado Supreme Court had offered a Hunter analysis, and the Romer
Court affirmed, although "on a rationale different from that adopted by the State Supreme Court." See Romer, 517 U.S. at 626.
II. See Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648 (Ct.
App. 1991).
12. See Equality Foundation, 128 F.3d at 296-97. See also Equality Foundation, 518
U.S. at 1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that this case involves a decision by the
lowest electoral subunit).
13. In Hunter, the citizens of Akron had adopted an amendment to the City Charter via referendum that required voter ratification of ordinances adopted by the City
Council to preclude housing discrimination. 393 U.S. at 386.
14. See Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting), superseded by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn on
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interpretations. Yet, much of the analysis in Bowers established
that sodomy was not protected by the right to privacy rather
than that only same-sex sodomy was not protected. On a charitable interpretation of the Bowers opinion, the Court was addressing same-sex sodomy because that was the issue before the
Court. It is for this very reason that, as Koppelman points out,
states may be constitutionally permitted to prohibit sodomy generally but nonetheless be precluded by equal protection constraints from solely prohibiting same-sex sodomy. (p. 32)
The Bowers stumbling block seems more attitudinal than
constitutional. Thus, if the right to privacy protected by the Federal Constitution does not include the right to engage in sodomy
with a same-sex or different sex partner outside the confines of
marriage, 15 Bowers does not provide the constitutional stumbling
block to the recognition of orientation as a suspect or quasisuspect classification that has sometimes been suggested. 16 A
separate question is whether the case nonetheless symbolizes the
reluctance of some members of the Court to permit the LGBT
community to have more than second-class status/ 7 but that will
not be discussed here.
Koppelman writes, "Reasonable people disagree about
whether hatred and stereotyping of gays is sufficiently pervasive
in our society to warrant judicial suspicion of laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation." (p. 28) Yet, he had previously made a convincing case that such hatred and stereotyping were pervasive. (pp. 21-22) What seems to be in dispute is
not whether the hatred is pervasive but whether it is wrong. For
example, in his Romer dissent, Justice Scalia did not attempt to
deny but, rather, to justify the existence of animus on the basis of
orientation. 18
Koppelman believes that those seeking to advance the
LGBT legal cause are likely to be unsuccessful if their legal focus is on the right to privacy protected by the Federal Constitution. Although suggesting that the right to privacy is pretty
rehearing by 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The anti-homosexual thrust of Hardwick, and
the Court's willingness to condone anti-homosexual animus in the actions of the government, are clear.")
15. See, for example, Scare v. Lopes, 660 A.2d 707,710 (R.I. 1995) (nonmarital sodomy not protected by Federal Constitution).
16. See, for example, Romer, 517 U.S. at 640-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that Bowers somehow establishes the constitutionality of Amendment 2).
17. See, for example, id. at 636-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion was joined by both Justices Thomas and Rehnquist.
18. See id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

2002]

BOOK REVIEWS

765

firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence, (p. 39) he seems
wary of relying on that right, in part because it is not expressly
included in the constitutional text (p. 36) and in part because the
Court has not offered clear guidelines to help the lower courts
determine what it protects and what it does not. (p. 44) While
the Court has sometimes suggested that a "liberty must be
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"' 19 to qualify
as protected by the right to privacy, (p. 43) Koppelman rightly
suggests that this test is too indeterminate.
The difficulty with the history and tradition test, however, is
not merely that it is too indeterminate but that it is unable to account for those interests that have been recognized as protected
by the right to privacy. Contraception and abortion, for example,
had been proscribed for at least 80 years when the Court struck
down laws prohibiting them,20 and it is difficult to see how practices proscribed for several decades could be described as deeply
rooted within the nation's history and traditions. Thus, the history and tradition test is simply the wrong test to determine what
is protected by the right to privacy and what is not. The point
here of course is not that Koppleman made an error when referring to that test but, rather, that the Court cannot in good faith
claim that such a test accounts for what the right to privacy protects, implicit or explicit claims to the contrary notwithstanding.
Koppelman rightly suggests that society can impose incest
restrictions to protect the dynamics between parent and child (p.
48). He then suggests that it seems difficult to draw any abstract
limit on government's power to regulate sexual behavior if, indeed, society has a legitimate interest in regulating incest. Yet, it
is not at all clear why that is so. Certainly, there is no need to
maintain an incest-like taboo on same-sex relations to preserve
the monogamous family. There need be no poisoning of the parent-child relation when the parent has sexual relations with her
same-sex or, for that matter, different-sex, adult partner, and the
category of "monogamous families" should include same-sex
parents who are raising their children just as it includes differentsex parents (whether or not married) who are raising their children.
19. Quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
20. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972) (Massachusetts statute prohibiting contraception stemmed from statute passed in 1879); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
501 (1961) (Connecticut contraception statute passed in 1879). See also Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (Texas statutes at issue prohibiting abortion were typical of those in
effect for about a century).
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Koppelman suggests that a close reading of the right to privacy cases makes clear that they "are less concerned with promoting sexual liberty than they are with promoting social cohesion and deference to traditional institutions." (p. 49) Yet, it is
hardly as if one must choose between sexual liberty on the one
hand and deference to traditional institutions on the other.
Commentators can debate whether the Court was "concerned
with social stability" (p. 50) when holding that the right to privacy protected access to contraception and abortion, but the
right to privacy cases do not seem plausibly characterized as deferring to traditional institutions. Such a reading ignores some of
the other cases handed down during the period under discussion-for example, Stanley v. Illinoi?- 1 in which the Court struck
down an Illinois statute under which "the children of unwed fathers become wards of the State upon the death of the
mother. '" 22 Holding such a statute unconstitutional hardly involved deference to traditional institutions such as marriage.
Koppelman implies that his interpretation of the right to
privacy cases as representing deference to traditional institutions
is supported by Belle Terre v. Boraas,23 which he describes as
"upholding an ordinance that prohibited persons unrelated by
blood marriage, or adoption from living together." (p. 167 n.102)
Yet, Belle Terre does not seem particularly supportive of marriage, and the ordinance itself is better described as limiting the
number of unrelated persons who might live together. The Belle
Terre Court specifically rejected the claim that the ordinance
"reeks with an animosity to unmarried couples who live together. There is no evidence to support it; and the provision of
the ordinance bringing within the definition of a 'family' two
unmarried people belies the charge. "24 The Court considered the
objection "that if two unmarried people can constitute a 'family,'
there is no reason why three or four may not," 25 but noted that
"every line drawn by a leRislature leaves some out that might
well have been included." 6 While one might disagree with the
Court about the reasonableness of precluding three of four unrelated persons from living together, one would be wrong to infer

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

405 u.s. 645 (1972).
Id. at 646.
416 u.s. 1 (1974).
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
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that the Belle Terre Court was upholding an ordinance precluding non-marital couples from cohabiting.
It is important to be able to point to options in addition to
sexual liberty on the one hand and traditional institutions on the
other insofar as one wishes to capture some of the invidious aspects of the current same-sex marriage bans. At least one of the
stereotypical views of individuals with a same-sex orientation is
that they are always seeking sexual gratification/7 and implying
that Bowers simply involves a choice between tradition and licentiousness plays into the stereotyping that Koppelman rightly
criticizes. (p. 24) While Koppelman criticizes Hardwick as a
"disastrously bad piece of judicial craftsmanship," (p. 50) one
might rightly be surprised by his claim that "one cannot say that
the result in Hardwick is not consistent with the preceding privacy case law." (p. 50) Many not only can but do make such a
claim, citing a variety of cases in support.
Koppelman is likely correct that the right to privacy protected by the Federal Constitution will not be construed as protecting the right to marry a same-sex partner. However, that is
not because the right to privacy jurisprudence cannot or even
should not be read to include such a right but because of the
Court's cramped reading of its own jurisprudence in this area.
State constitutions also protect the right to privacy, and pressing
claims involving the right to privacy protections guaranteed by
the state constitutions has been and may continue to be useful
when seeking to secure protections for the LGBT community. 28
Koppelman argues that much discrimination against gays
and lesbians is sex discrimination because it is designed to promote particular gender roles. (p. 64) His argument is plausiblesome of the discrimination against the LGBT community is
likely motivated by the desire to discourage individuals from
adopting nontraditional gender roles or attitudes, or engaging in
"sex-inappropriate" behaviors. (See p. 64.) However, he does
not adequately differentiate and discuss a different sex discrimination argument that has been accepted by some courts. Consider, for example, a statute that prohibits individuals of the
same sex from marrying. One criticism of such a ban is that it in27. See Richard D. Mohr, Gays and Justice: A Study of Ethics, Society, and Law 25
(Columbia U. Press, 1988) (discussing "the stereotype of gays as sex-crazed maniacs").
28. See, for example, Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002) (sodomy statute
violates right to privacy under state constitution); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga.
1998) (same); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (same); Commonwealth v.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (same).
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valves an attempt to enforce particular gender stereotypes. The
focus of such a criticism is on what the statute aims to achieve.
Another criticism, however, is that a same-sex marriage ban expressly discriminates on the basis of sex because it precludes a
man from marrying a man but not a woman and because it precludes a woman from marrying a woman but not a man. 29 Here,
the focus is not on the goal but simply on the classification itself.
A separate issue is whether an "exceedingly persuasive justification"30 can be offered for this sex-based classification, but the focus is on whether such a classification was made and on whether
the state can meet its burden for employing such a classification,
and not solely on whether the classification is designed to reinforce stereotypical gender roles and attitudes.
One might contrast a same-sex marriage ban with a statute
that classifies on the basis of orientation, e.g., an adoption statute that precludes lesbians or gays from adopting. 31 The former
prohibits all individuals, regardless of orientation, from marrying
someone of the same sex and permits them to marry someone of
a different sex, assuming that other limitations like age or consanguinity are not a bar. The latter precludes anyone, regardless
of sex, from adopting if he or she has a same-sex orientation.
The point here should not be misunderstood. Both marriage
statutes precluding individuals of the same sex from marrying
and adoption statutes precluding those with a same-sex orientation from adopting impose substantial burdens on the LGBT
community. Such statutes obviously impose much greater burdens on individuals with a same-sex orientation than on individuals with a different-sex orientation and should be held unconstitutional. Thus, the claim here is not, for example, that
same-sex marriage bans are constitutionally permissible because
they permit LGBT individuals to marry, although not their lifepartners?2 Just as the interracial ban at issue in Loving v. Virginia33 was unconstitutional notwithstanding its permitting indi29. Sec Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64 (Haw. 1993) ("HRS § 572-1, on its face and
as applied, regulates access to the marital status and its concomitant rights and benefits
on the basis of the applicants' sex.")
30. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (citing Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,724 (1982)).
31. See Fla. Stat. Ann.§§ 63.042 (3) (West 1997) ("No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.")
32. Depending upon the laws of the particular state, a post-operative transsexual
may be able to marry his or her life-partner, even though anyone who saw them would
say that they were of the same sex.
33. 388 u.s. 1 (1%7).
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viduals to marry others of their own race, same-sex marriage
bans are impermissible notwithstanding their permitting LGBT
individuals to marry someone of a different sex.
The point here is merely that statutes prohibiting same-sex
marriage classify on the basis of sex rather than orientation.
Those with a same-sex orientation are permitted to marry individuals of a different sex and individuals with a different-sex orientation are not permitted to marry someone of the same sex.
As to how often those with a same-sex orientation would want to
marry someone of a different sex or those with a different-sex
orientation would want to marry someone of the same sex, e.g.,
to secure financial and emotional if not sexual benefits, that is a
separate question which need not be addressed here.
Certainly, it is plausible to claim that the intention of samesex marriage bans is to target those with a same-sex orientation,
but that suggests that the sex-based classification is being used in
a way that is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. Thus, at
least one answer to those who say that sex-discrimination and
orientation-discrimination are different is not to suggest that all
instances of the latter are instances of the former, (see pp. 60-61)
but instead to say that they are different and that same-sex marriage bans are an example of an invidious sex-based rather than
orientation-based classification.
Koppelman addresses the New Natural Law (NNL) theorists' attempts to justify same-sex marriage bans. He pays careful
attention to their arguments and offers a variety of reasons to establish that their claims are not persuasive. One surprising element in his analysis, however, is his suggestion that "there are
intuitions that most Americans share ... that the NNL theorists
have defended more thoughtfully and coherently than anyone
else." (p. 80)
The NNL theorists try to justify the claim that "whatever
goods a same-sex couple is capable of achieving together, marriage is simply impossible for them, because of the kind of thing
that marriage is." (p. 80) Koppelman suggests that while most
Americans "do not believe that sex is valuable only for purposes
of procreation," since they "approve of heterosexual marriages
of the elderly and infertile, for example," they nonetheless believe that "these cases [marriages involving the infertile or elderly] realize something uniquely valuable that is not realized by
the same-sex couple." (p. 80) Koppelman concludes that the
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"NNL's views, while they are often obscure, are not idiosyncratic." (p. 80)
Yet, it may be that NNL's views about same-sex marriage
coincide with those of many Americans only in the conclusion
reached and, further, that the common conclusion may be due to
a mistake of fact. It may be, for example, that many believe that
the function of marriage is to provide a setting in which children
can thrive and also believe, even if mistakenly, either that the
LGBT c:Jmmunity is not having and raising children or that
members of the LGBT community cannot be good parents. Precisely because same-sex couples have children to raise and are
raising them well, the notion that marriage is important for the
sake of children militates in favor of rather than against recognition of same-sex unions.
While the NNL theorists reach the same conclusion that
many Americans draw, namely, that marriage is only for two individuals of different sexes, this does not mean that the NNL
theory: (1) is internally consistent, (2) captures why many
Americans believe that marriage should be reserved for different-sex couples, or (3) reflects other aspects of domestic relations law so that it can sensibly be incorporated within or provide a justification for current law. For purposes here, the
relevant issue is (3).
Existing state laws specifying the conditions under which
individuals might marry do not reflect the NNL theory's account
of which types of relationships or acts count as marital. For example, individuals who do not wish to have children and who are
only interested in assuring themselves of a consistent sexual
partner would not be precluded from marrying on that account.
So, too, individuals who always use contraception or, perhaps,
who are sterilized so that they can have sexual relations without
fear of conceiving also will be permitted to marry, and individuals who make use of advanced reproductive technologies so that
they might have and raise children also are not viewed by the
law as incapable of partaking of the goods of marriage, NNL
view notwithstanding.
Just as state laws do not reflect the NNL view of marriage,
the constitutional jurisprudence regarding the right to marry
does not either. The Court has articulated numerous interests
that are implicated in marriage-marriages are expressions of
emotional support and public commitment, they may involve an
expression of religious faith or personal dedication, and mar-
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riages may be a pre-condition to the receipt of government benefits.34 These are interests that are shared by both same-sex and
different-sex couples and simply do not rely on the kind of view
offered by the NNL theorists.
In Zablocki v. Redhai/, 35 the Court suggested that it "is not
surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the
same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation,
childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships," because it
"would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the
decision to enter [into) the relationship that is the foundation of
the family in our society." 36 Same-sex couples not only are raising children but have legally recognized parent-child relationships protected by the right to privacy. Were the Supreme Court
to take seriously its own explanations of why the right to marry
is so important, the Court would recognize that the right to
marry a same-sex partner is protected by the right to privacy
guarantees provided by the Federal Constitution.
The NNL account of marriage neither represents existing
law nor the constitutional interests implicated in marriage and
thus can hardly rationalize or justify current state or constitutional law. Just as the history and tradition test does not adequately account for what is included within the right to privacy
because it excludes too much, the NNL view cannot account for
which marriages should be recognized as a matter of state or
constitutional law because it excludes too much. The difficulty
pointed to here is not Koppelman's rejection of the NNL view
but rather his implicit or explicit suggestion that such a view either represents what most Americans believe or that it somehow
captures the legal understanding of marriage either as a matter
of state or constitutional law. Regardless of whether one is convinced by Koppelman's criticisms of that view, the NNL understanding of marriage simply does not capture the legal view of
marriage and thus should not be used to "justify" state refusals
to recognize same-sex marriages.
Currently, no state recognizes same-sex marriage, although
Vermont recognizes civil unions. It seems plausible to believe,
however, that same-sex marriage will someday be recognized in
one or more states. When that happens, those states not permit34.
35.
36.

See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987).
434 u.s. 374 (1978).
Id. at 386.
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ting such marriages to be celebrated will have to decide whether
to recognize those same-sex marriages validly celebrated in a different state.
To understand the issues implicated in the interstate recognition of marriage, it is important to consider some of the different.contexts in which this issue might arise. Consider three categones:
Category1
A couple wishes to marry. However, their domicile treats
their marriage as void and, perhaps, has a law prohibiting their
evading local law by going to another state to marry. They nonetheless go to another state where their marriage is permitted,
marry, and then return horne. An issue arises in which the validity of their marriage is important to establish.
Category2
A couple marries in accordance with the law of their domicile and lives there for several years. They then move to a new
domicile, which would not have permitted the couple to marry
had they been domiciled there at the time of their union's celebration. An issue arises in which the validity of their marriage is
important to establish.
Category3
A couple marries in their own domicile in accord with local
law. They vacation in another state, which would not have permitted them to marry had they been domiciled in that state. An
issue arises in which the validity of their marriage is important to
establish.
The strongest case for non-recognition involves the type of
marriage included in Category1. Assuming that no constitutional
guarantees are violated by the statute, the law of the domicile at
the time of the marriage traditionally determines the validity of
the marriage. This does not mean, however, that a marriage that
could not have been celebrated in the domicile will not be recognized even if valid where celebrated. As Koppelman suggests,
(p. 95) even marriages in this category are valid everywhere if
valid where celebrated, as long as they do not violate a strong
public policy of the domicile.
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It might seem surprising that a state would not permit a

marriage to be celebrated locally but would nonetheless recognize it if validly celebrated elsewhere. Yet, this is less surprising
than first appears when one considers the state's interests in
promoting marriage and in promoting the legitimacy of children.
Nonetheless, in this kind of case, the couple seems least entitled
to complain if their domicile refuses to recognize their union.
They knew that local law prohibited their marriage and went
elsewhere to evade that law. Of the couples in the three categories discussed here, this couple is least likely to be thought to
have had a reasonable and justified expectation that their marriage would be recognized.
It is not surprising that most of the recorded cases involve
some version of the marriage described in Category1• This was a
much less mobile country in the past and couples were less likely
to move to a new state to start a new life. It was much easier to
cross a border to celebrate a marriage where it was permitted,
but then to return to one's domicile and to one's job, family, and
friends.
For purposes here, the question is whether a state will recognize a marriage between same-sex partners that was validly
celebrated in another state. Many states have already passed
statutes that suggest that the state will not recognize a same-sex
marriage regardless of when or where it was celebrated. 37 While
these statutes will have to be construed by the courts, one possible reading of them is that they not only apply to marriages described in Category~> but also apply to the marriages described in
Category2 and Category3 •

37. Ga. Code Ann.§ 19-3-3.1 (b) (Lexis 1999):
No marriage between persons of the same sex shall be recognized as entitled to
the benefits of marriage. Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex
pursuant to a marriage license issued by another state or foreign jurisdiction or
otherwise shall be void in this state. Any contractual rights granted by virtue of
such license shall be unenforceable in the courts of this state and the courts of
this state shall have no jurisdiction whatsoever under any circumstances to grant
a divorce or separate maintenance with respect to such marriage or otherwise to
consider or rule on any of the parties' respective rights arising as a result of or in
connection with such marriage.
Ala. Code§ 30-1-19 (e) (Lexis 1998) ("The State of Alabama shall not recognize as valid
any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to have occurred as
a result of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage license was issued."); Va. Code Ann. § 20-45.2 (Lexis 2000) ("A marriage between persons of the
same sex is prohibited. Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex in another
state or jurisdiction shall be void in all respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created by such marriage shall be void and unenforceable.")
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Koppelman wishes to defend the "modest claim" that were
one of the states to recognize same-sex marriages, no state
would be required by local law to refuse to recognize such marriages for all purposes. (p. 98) Yet, if state and federal constitutional guarantees are bracketed, Koppelman's modest claim may
nonetheless be too bold. Many states have articulated strong
public policy statements against recognizing same-sex marriage,
and the question at hand is whether a state legislature could bind
the state's courts in all cases to refuse to give any effect to such
marriages.
Koppelman suggests that "a blanket rule of non-recognition
would be a radical departure from pre-existing choice-of-law
principles and should not be adopted." (p. 102) He is correct
both that this would be a radical departure and that this would
be unwise, but those points address the choice-of-law rules that
states should adopt. A different issue is whether as a matter of
existing law courts have the discretion that he believes that they
should, and yet another issue is whether the laws that might be
crafted in the future in different state legislatures would nonetheless give judges "a free hand to craft sensible conflicts rules."
(p. 116) It is not at all clear that states do or must permit their
courts to have discretion to recognize same-sex marriages for
particular purposes or for any purpose, even if the states would
be wise to do so. 38
Koppelman discusses two important marriage cases that fall
into Category2• Each case involved an interracial couple who had
validly celebrated their marriage in their domicile, and then had
subsequently moved to a jurisdiction which would not have permitted them to marry had they been domiciled in the latter jurisdiction at the time of the marriage. Koppelman notes that the
two state supreme courts reached different conclusions with respect to the validity of the interracial marriages before them, but
he then uncharacteristically fails to offer the kind of deep analysis of the cases that he offers elsewhere. This is regrettable, because these cases cry out for examination.
In State v. Bell,39 the Supreme Court of Tennessee refused
to recognize an interracial marriage validly celebrated in Mississippi. The Bell court cited examples of cases where a state could
38. This is assuming for the sake of argument that no state or federal constitutional
guarantees require recognition of same-sex marriages for certain purposes or under certain conditions.
39. 66 Tenn. 9 (1872).
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refuse to recognize a marriage validly celebrated in another
domicile-incest and polygamy40 -and then said that because
the marriage before the court was no less revolting or unnatural
than those, 41 the state could refuse to recognize the interracial
marriage as well.
The difficulty here was that the court was using the wrong
test, which traditionally was not whether the marriage was
viewed in the forum with great distaste but instead whether the
marriage was either incestuous or polygamous. The distaste test
would simply have been too easy to meet, since the marriage
would not even have been challenged unless the state had articulated a strong public policy against such marriages. Basically, the
Bell court implied that the same standard for non-recognition
should be used for marriages in Category1 and Category2, and
that a marriage violating an important public policy simply
should not be recognized regardless of whether it was valid in
the domicile at the time of its celebration. Yet, marriages in
these two different categories were traditionally treated quite
differently, at least in part, because the former was celebrated
even though the couple was on notice that their domicile precluded the marriage, whereas the latter was celebrated when the
couple might reasonably and justifiably have believed that their
legally permitted marriage would continue to be recognized.
It may well be that the Bell court was sensitive to the difficulty posed by its treating marriages in Category1 and Category2
in the same way, for it did not even mention that the marria~e at
issue had been validly celebrated in a different domicile. 4 Indeed, the Tennessee Supreme Court does not make that point
clear until it issues a different decision seventeen years later in
which the court explains what was at issue in Bell.43
In State v. Ross44 the North Carolina Supreme Court used
the traditional test to determine whether a marriage validly
40. Id. at 11.
41. Id.
42. The court writes, "The question to be determined is, does a marriage in Mississippi protect persons who live together in this State in violation of the act of the General
Assembly of the 27th of June, 1870?" Id. at 9. Here, the court does not even mention
where the parties were domiciled at the time of the marriage.
43. One needs to consult Pennegar & Haney v. State, 10 S.W. 305 (Tenn. 1889) to
find out that the parties in Bell were domiciled in Mississippi at the time of the marriage.
See id. at 307 ("in State v. Bell, 7 Baxt. 9, this Court held that a marriage between a white
person and a negro, valid in Mississippi where celebrated, was void here, in a case
whether the parties were domiciled in Mississippi at the time of the marriage"). 87 Tenn.
244,251.
44. 76 N.C. 242 (1877).
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celebrated in another domicile would be recognized. The court
held that because the marriage validly celebrated in the domicile
was neither polygamous nor incestuous,45 it would be recognized.46 The North Carolina Supreme Court would not have recognized the interracial marriage validly celebrated in South
Carolina had the degree of distaste been the relevant test, since
the court made clear how offensive it found the marriage. 47 Indeed, when the State Attorney-General suggested that the state
need not recognize the interracial marriage validly celebrated in
a different domicile because "a marriage between persons of different races is as unnatural and revolting as an incestuous one,"48
the court rejected that argument and instead pointed out that
"[i]t is impossible to identify this case with that of an incestuous
or polygamous marriage." 49 The court decided that the costs associated with not recognizing a non-polygamous, non-incestuous
marriage validly celebrated in the domicile at the time of celebration were simply too great, and recognized the marriage.50
One would be wrong to infer from the Ross decision, however, that North Carolina did not believe that interracial marriages violated an important public policy. In the very same year
in which Ross was decided, the North Carolina Supreme Court
refused to recognize an interracial marria?e celebrated in South
Carolina by North Carolina domiciliaries. 5
Ko_ppelman correctly notes that a federal court in Ex parte
Kinney"· suggests that a state would not have to recognize an interracial marriage validly celebrated in another domicile were
the couple to have subsequently emigrated to the state. Yet,
Koppelman does not seem to appreciate how Kinney may undercut the ability of states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages validly celebrated elsewhere in certain circumstances.
The Kinney court discussed three different scenarios, one
from Category~> one from Category2 , and one from Category3•
The actual case before the court fell into Category1 , since it involved an interracial marriage celebrated by Virginia domiciliaries who had attempted to evade local law by marrying in
45. See id. at 245-46.
46. See id. at 247 (the marriage would be recognized because neither polygamous
nor incestuous).
47. See id. at 246 (discussing how "revolting" the marriage was to the court).
48. Id. at 245.
49. Id. at 247.
50. See id.
51. See State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1877).
52. 14 F. Cas. 602 (E.D. Va. 1879).
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the District of Columbia. The court believed this an easy case
and held the marriage void.
While recognizing that the case would have been more difficult had the couple validly celebrated their marriage in their own
domicile before moving to Virginia,53 the court ultimately concluded that the United States Constitution would not require
Virginia to recognize such a marriage. Thus, the court believed
that the United States Constitution would not preclude Virginia
from refusing to recognize marriages in Category1 and in Category2. However, the court offered a different position when analyzing cases in Category3, suggesting that if an interracial couple
had celebrated their marriage in their domicile of the District of
Columbia and then had merely traveled through Virginia, the
state would have been constitutionally required to recognize the
marriage, local policy notwithstanding. 54
Koppelman suggests that Kinney held that "even conceding
a state's right to outlaw interracial marriages, that state was obligated to make reasonable accommodation of those states that
held different views on the miscegenation question." (p. 113)
Yet, Kinney was not offering an accommodation theory but was
instead offering an analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment and
privileges and immunities protections afforded by the United
States Constitution.
The Kinney court's conclusion that the Fourteenth
Amendment offers no protection for interracial marriages55 is
simply no longer good law. 56 What is more interesting is the
Kinney court's suggestion that privileges and immunities guarantees would protect the interracial marriage of individuals traveling through a particular state.57 At least two points might be
made about such a suggestion. First, this means that states refusing to recognize marriages in Category3 may be violating privileges and immunities guarantees. Second, given Saenz v. Roe58 in
which the Court suggested that privileges and immunities guarantees are not only implicated when one visits a state but may
also be implicated when one emigrates to a new state, states refusing to recognize marriages in Category2 may also be violating
privileges and immunities guarantees.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

58.

See id. at 606.
ld.
Id. at 605.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
Kinney, 14 F. Cas. at 606.
526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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Any discussion of the interstate recognition of same-sex
marriages must examine the Defense of Marriage Act. The Act
has two sections, one defining marriage for federal purposes and
the other discussing the full faith and credit that would be due to
same-sex marriages in other states. Koppelman suggests that the
former would seem difficult to challenge on constitutional
grounds. (p. 128) Yet, Koppelman's pessimism may not be justified, given the unprecedented nature of Congress's refusal to defer to state definitions of marriage (p. 136) and the Court's having explained that Congress can only supplant state law in these
kinds of matters where important federal interests would
thereby be protected. 59
Koppelman rightly suggests that Romer might helpfully be
used to establish the unconstitutionality of DOMA. One might
consult the Congressional Record to see the impermissible motivation of (some of) those supporting DOMA and, as Koppelman
suggests, the statute on its face suggests invidious purpose. (p.
139) Thus, even were the Court to reject that invidious motivation could be inferred from the comments of particular members
of Congress,60 the unprecedented nature of DOMA and the
breadth of the burden that it imposes on certain individuals
should be enough to make DOMA's invidiousness clear.
In his epilogue, Koppelman criticizes Justice Johnson who
suggests in her concurrence in Baker v. State61 that Vermont
should recognize same-sex marriage rather than permit a different status-civil unions-to be created. Koppelman writes, "If
same-sex marriage really is required by high principle-and
Amestoy and Johnson both agree that it is-then it is no light
thing to act in a way that makes it less rather than more likely
that such marriages will in fact be recognized and remain so." (p.
144) Basically, he believes that had the Vermont court found
same-sex marriage protected by the Vermont Constitution, then
the constitution would have been changed by the electorate. For
support that such a result would occur, he points to what happened in both Alaska and Hawaii, namely, those state constitu-

59. See Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619,625 (1987) (citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439
U.S. 572,581 (1979) (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)) ("Before a
state law governing domestic relations will be overridden, it 'must do "major damage" to
"clear and substantial" federal interests"').
60. Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("It is a familiar principle
of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.")
61. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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tions were changed to prevent the states from recognizing samesex marriage. (p. 142)
Yet, Koppelman rightly suggests that the Hawaii Supreme
Court deserves praise for having recognized the merit in the
claim that the state's refusal to recognize same-sex marriage implicated equal protection guarantees on the basis of sex, (p. 152)
even though the Hawaii decision led to both a state constitutional amendment in Hawaii and to Congress's passing the Defense of Marriage Act. The criticism made of Justice Johnson's
concurrence and suggested remedy might also have been made
of the Hawaii plurality opinion in Baehr v. Lewin,62 namely, that
the decision did not seem likely to lead to the continued recognition of same-sex marriage, and some of the praise given to the
Baehr opinion might also have been offered for Justice Johnson's concurrence.
Koppelman's ambivalence about who deserves praise is unsurprising. Very important interests are implicated in marriage,
and the LGBT community is severely burdened by current marriage laws. Civil union status, while less attractive than marital
status, is nonetheless quite attractive-it offers emotional, financial, and symbolic benefits, which would not otherwise be available, both to same-sex partners and to any children that the couple might be raising. Courts are in the unenviable position of
realizing what the law requires and also realizing the practical
implications of issuing a decision which, although reflecting the
law, is very unpopular. It is extremely regrettable that courts are
put in such an untenable position, and the Baehr plurality and all
members of the Baka court deserve praise for their implicit or
explicit recognition that state refusals to recognize same-sex relationships involves invidious discrimination.
Koppelman addresses many of the legal issues that are implicated by current state same-sex marriage bans and that will be
implicated when some states finally recognize such unions. His
analyses are both controversial and thought-provoking. While
same-sex marriage proponents and opponents might disagree
with the particular tacks that Koppelman takes, they all must
admit that he helps to put many of the issues sharply into focus,
itself no mean feat.

62.
1993).

852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw.

